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Post by Thoithoi O'Cottage on Mar 4, 2014 8:15:35 GMT 5.5
John Shand, in his book "Arguing Well" (Routledge, London, 2000), asks why we at many points fail to convince people with the best of our reasons. We give every reason there is, but still some people remain stone-cold, unmoved. Thus, he very importantly adds a chapter at the end of his book, Understanding Reason is not Enough. The chapter begins with: Telling people what the nature of reason is is only effective and perhaps worthwhile if they can be induced to reason in the first place. There are all sorts of causes or forces that might make them not do so. This is just a fact about human beings, and is what is meant by saying that understanding reason is not enough. It is not the fault of the nature of reason itself that we fail to use it or use it properly. The act of reasoning, as opposed to reason itself, is something we do, and as such it is open to the influence of causal processes because the act of reasoning is itself a causal process. Neither the nature of reason itself—because it is not a causal process at all – nor the understanding of reason—because its influence is not powerful enough—is enough to ensure that people use reason and use it well. Reason cannot force us to reason. Understanding reason is not enough. The threat to arguing well, or good reasoning, stems often from features of our psychology other than an inability to grasp rational principles. The aim here is to indicate what lessons can be learned from the fact that psychological factors undermine our ability to argue well, and what can be done to oppose such factors. We are not purely logical creatures. We have a faculty of reason, an ability and sometimes a causal inclination to reason, but this is not enough to control those powerful non-rational processes that lead us to fail to reason, but nevertheless cause us to have beliefs, when reasoning is what we should have been doing. I will present the essence of this chapter in another or other posts as will follow this thread opener.
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Post by Thoithoi O'Cottage on Mar 11, 2014 6:27:13 GMT 5.5
John Shand says being a skilled logician and precise reasoner in some field does not guarantee that you will apply reason when you should and not succumb to prejudice and illusion. Logicians and precise reasoners in particular fields are just as susceptible to the causes that blind them in certain cases, to such an extent that they hold beliefs without examining them rationally when they should. For example, Isaac Newton practiced alchemy, Nazi (pronounced ˈnɑːtsi) Germany and Communist Russia had many brilliant academics and scientists capable of precise reasoning who supported regimes whose theoretical bases were faulty, and whose practices were disastrous and produced terrible harm and oppression. Shand points out three types of processes when people try to argue: A rational process is one that obeys the laws of logic as in: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal. An irrational process is one that breaks the laws of logic as in: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is tall. Socrates may be tall, but the conclusion in this argument, his being tall, does not logically follow from the premises “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man”. “Therefore, Socrates is short” does not make the argument less irrational. A non-rational process is one that cannot be said either to obey or to break the laws of logic; such processes simply happen. A tree falling on me. Of course irrational processes may lead us to true propositions; but if they do so they do so only by chance, because there is no real logical connection between the conclusions and the propositions on which they are supposedly based; that is, the conclusion could be supposed false while the premises could be supposed true; although the conclusion could happen, even in this case, to be true—the point is that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Non-rational processes may lead us to argue badly or not at all, when we should be reasoning and reasoning well. The way in which non-rational processes do this fits exactly with the way in which arguments can fail. There are two ways in which arguments can fail to either of which bad non-rational processes lead us: (i) Bad non-rational processes lead us either to fail to consider whether there are premises being given at all for the conclusion we are expected to accept or, if they are considered, to come to accept false premises as true.
(ii) Bad non-rational processes lead us to disregard validity or to accept invalid steps in arguments. Again, we may still hit upon the truth in the conclusion, but it is a dangerous game—we have only hit upon the truth by luck. We were lucky this time perhaps, but the next time we may not be. We should therefore try to apply reason in such cases. Both arguers and the audience of arguments are susceptible to irrational or non-rational processes of thinking. The arguer may slide off the rational track, or while he argues impeccably rationally, the audience may still be irrational or non-rational, and this may lead to them not meeting. Even when they meet, they may meet out of sheer luck, if they are not guided by reason. Therefore, arguers should bear in mind that they may be impeccably rational and precise in their arguments, but they can still fail to convince their irrational or non-rational audience. Then, the arguers have to do some extra work, by getting down to the basics.
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Post by Thoithoi O'Cottage on Mar 11, 2014 6:51:04 GMT 5.5
To illustrate the points being made above, John Shand narrates a true story: In the 1930s a Jewish socialist journalist attended a Nazi rally held at Nuremberg. He was hardly a person favourably inclined to what he was witnessing. Hitler was on the platform addressing a huge crowd and demonstrating his skill in mass oratory before an enthusiastic audience. Much of what Hitler had to say was in the form of unsubstantiated assertions presented without argument and delivered in heated emotive language. No doubt much of it was anti-Semitic and deeply hostile to the socialism the reporter believed in. Nevertheless, after about half an hour of the tirade from Hitler, the Jewish socialist journalist started to feel left out; he felt the pull to belong, he wanted to feel a part of this body of people and to share in the beliefs of the enthusiastic Nazi supporters. (p. 88) John Shand's analysis of the psychology of this event is worth being quoted in its entirety: Was this because he was suddenly convinced by arguments he was hearing as to the truth of the beliefs being asserted? This is hardly likely. Not only was there hardly any argument presented for these beliefs, but what there was consisted of poor argument that failed to support the beliefs. The explanation is one of psychology, not of logic. The atmosphere in which the reporter heard the speech was one of warm jubilation arranged to engender a feeling of collective strength, well-being and togetherness. It seems to be a feature of human nature that often there is a strong tendency to want to be a part of such collective activities even in disregard of their merits. An element of being a part of such a gathering involves sharing beliefs. It is just a fact about human beings that in the right circumstances they find it hard to resist coming to hold the beliefs of those around them, no matter how absurd or unsubstantiated those beliefs may be in many cases. So what led to the unlikely situation of a Jewish socialist reporter desiring, albeit in passing, oneness of belief with those who clearly should have been anathema to him, was some sort of psychological fact about human beings combined with the facts of a certain situation. Nothing to do with reasoning at all. If it could have such power over this reporter, little wonder that those already sympathetic to what was being said found it all but overwhelming, and easy to be firmly convinced of the truth of the claims that were being asserted, regardless of the quality or indeed the existence of arguments. (p. 89) Communal mentality works like this--people don't want to be left out, and most people don't have enough rationality, wisdom or moral strength to resist such a pull to belong. When you argue with a person of such mentality, you may fail to convince him/her with the finest of your reasons. Then, you see the need to get down to the bottom and start your argument up from there, from the basics, which you share. The disagreement must be somewhere above. If we start from the bottom, from the basics we will see where we start to differ--the root(s) of disagreement, and you may want to see whether you can analyze the problem zones and convince (if you still believe your arguments are valid) them.
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